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MIMO Wiretap Channel under Receiver Side
Power Constraints with Applications to
Wireless Power Transfer and Cognitive Radio
Karim Banawan Sennur Ulukus
Abstract
We consider the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel under a minimum receiver-
side power constraint in addition to the usual maximum transmitter-side power constraint. This problem
is motivated by energy harvesting communications with wireless energy transfer, where an added goal
is to deliver a minimum amount of energy to a receiver in addition to delivering secure data to another
receiver. In this paper, we characterize the exact secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel under
transmitter and receiver-side power constraints. We first show that solving this problem is equivalent to
solving the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel under a double-sided correlation matrix constraint
on the channel input. We show the converse by extending the channel enhancement technique to our
case. We present two achievable schemes that achieve the secrecy capacity: the first achievable scheme
uses a Gaussian codebook with a fixed mean, and the second achievable scheme uses artificial noise (or
cooperative jamming) together with a Gaussian codebook. The role of the mean or the artificial noise is
to enable energy transfer without sacrificing from the secure rate. This is the first instance of a channel
model where either the use of a mean signal or the use of channel prefixing via artificial noise is strictly
necessary for the MIMO wiretap channel. We then extend our work to consider a maximum receiver-side
power constraint instead of a minimum receiver-side power constraint. This problem is motivated by
cognitive radio applications, where an added goal is to decrease the received signal energy (interference
temperature) at a receiver. We further extend our results to: requiring receiver-side power constraints
at both receivers; considering secrecy constraints at both receivers to study broadcast channels with
confidential messages; and removing the secrecy constraints to study the classical broadcast channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most existing literature on Gaussian channels is based on a transmitter-side average power
constraint. This constraint models the maximum allowable power at the transmitter-side. Gastpar
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2[1] was the first to consider a receiver-side power constraint. In [1], he considered a maximum
receiver-side power constraint motivated by the desire to limit the received interference in a
cognitive radio application. He observed that, while the solution does not change with respect to
a classical transmitter-side power constraint for a single-input single-output (SISO) channel, it
changes significantly for a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel. Subsequently, Varsh-
ney [2] considered a minimum receiver-side power constraint motivated by the desire to transport
both information and energy simultaneously over a wireless channel. This minimum receiver-
side power constraint signified the power (in addition to data) transferred to the receiver by the
same physical signal. Varshney as well observed that while the solution does not change with
respect to a classical transmitter-side power constrained SISO channel, it changes significantly
with respect to a classical transmitter-side amplitude constrained SISO channel [3].
In this paper, we consider a multi-user and multi-objective version of the problem consid-
ered by Gastpar and Varshney. In particular, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel where the
transmitter wishes to have secure communication with a legitimate receiver in the presence of an
eavesdropper. In this model, messages need to be sent at the highest reliable rate to the legitimate
receiver with perfect secrecy from the eavesdropper. We impose the usual transmitter-side power
constraint in addition to a receiver-side power constraint. Therefore, our model generalizes the
receiver-side power constraint of Gastpar and Varshney from a single-user setting of two nodes
to a multi-user scenario of a wiretap channel with three nodes, and also to a multi-objective
setting where we have both reliability and security constraints.
The wiretap channel was first considered by Wyner in [4], where he determined the rate-
equivocation region of a degraded wiretap channel. This model was generalized to arbitrary, not
necessarily degraded, channels by Csiszar and Korner in [5], where they determined the rate-
equivocation region of the most general wiretap channel. The SISO Gaussian wiretap channel,
which is degraded, was considered under a transmitter-side power constraint in [6], which showed
that Gaussian signalling is optimal. The MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel was considered in [7]–
[9], under a transmitter-side power constraint. These references showed that channel prefixing is
not needed, even though the MIMO wiretap channel is not degraded, and Gaussian signalling is
optimal. An interesting alternative proof is given in [10] based on the channel enhancement
technique developed in [11]. Reference [10] considers the MIMO wiretap channel under a
3transmitter-side correlation matrix constraint which is more general than a transmitter-side power
constraint. The results in [7]–[10] imply that artificial noise [12] or cooperative jamming [13]
is not needed for a MIMO wiretap channel under a transmitter-side power constraint.1
In this paper, we first characterize the secrecy capacity of the general MIMO wiretap channel
under a minimum receiver-side power constraint at the eavesdropper only. To this end, we first
show that, solving the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel under a transmitter-
side maximum power constraint and a receiver-side minimum power constraint is equivalent
to solving the secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel under a double-sided correlation
matrix constraint on the channel input at the transmitter. This is a generalization of the approach
of [10], [11], which shows that solving the capacity under a transmitter-side maximum power
constraint is equivalent to solving the capacity under a transmitter-side maximum correlation
matrix constraint. We then generalize the channel enhancement technique of [10], [11] to the
case of double-sided correlation matrix constraint. This gives us the converse.
We next show that the rates given in the converse can be achieved by two different achievable
schemes: a mean based scheme where the transmitter uses a Gaussian codebook with a fixed
mean, and an artificial noise [12] (or cooperative jamming [13]) based scheme, which uses
Gaussian channel prefixing with a Gaussian codebook. The role of the mean or the artificial noise
is to enable energy transfer without sacrificing from the secure rate; this helps to achieve the
receiver-side power constraint by sending non-message carrying signals. This is the first instance
of a channel model where either the use of a mean signal or the use of channel prefixing via
artificial noise is strictly necessary for the canonical MIMO wiretap channel. Note that while [20,
Section III] shows an alternative way of achieving MIMO secrecy capacity using artificial noise,
this is valid in the case of a covariance constraint, and the use of artificial noise in the MIMO
wiretap channel under a transmitter-side power constraint is strictly sub-optimal. We note that,
in a related work, references [21], [22] consider simultaneous information and energy transfer in
a MISO wiretap channel, and focus on optimizing the performance of a specific artificial noise
based achievable scheme with no claim of optimality. We also note a similar set-up in [23], [24],
where the authors consider the case of statistical channel state information only at the transmitter
and focus on optimizing asymptotic transmit covariance matrix of Gaussian codebooks without
1Note, however, that they may be needed in SISO/MISO/MIMO wiretap channels with imperfect channel state information
(CSI) [14]–[18] or multi-user versions of the wiretap channel (e.g., multiple access) even with perfect CSI [13], [19].
4artificial noise for the case of a large number of transmit antennas.
We then extend the developed methodology to find the capacities of the following related
channels. We first consider the case that both receivers (both Bob and Eve) have minimum
receiver-side power constraints. This corresponds to the case where wireless power should be
delivered to both users in the system, but secure communication is guaranteed only for one of the
receivers. We show that mean based or artificial noise based transmission achieves the secrecy
capacity of this model. Next, we impose maximum power constraints as opposed to minimum
power constraints at the receivers. This corresponds to a cognitive radio setting where we control
the received interference power at users. In this case, we show that ordinary Gaussian signalling is
sufficient, and there is no need for mean or artificial noise signalling. Next, we drop the secrecy
constraint and consider the classical MIMO broadcast channel (BC) with minimum receiver-
side power constraints. This models an unsecured communication scenario where simultaneous
power and information transfer is needed for both users. We prove that dirty paper coding (DPC)
used in [11] is optimal to achieve the capacity. This result intuitively verifies that, even though
we need minimum received power guarantees, neither mean or artificial noise transmission is
needed, because the freedom afforded by the design of the covariance matrices of the DPC
scheme suffices to achieve all desired feasible receiver-side powers. Finally, we put back the
secrecy constraints for both users and consider the BC with confidential messages BCCM [20].
We show that secure DPC (S-DPC) is optimal for the BCCM as in [20] without the need for
mean or artificial noise signalling.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, PRELIMINARIES AND THE MAIN RESULT
The MIMO wiretap channel with Nt antennas at the transmitter, Nr antennas at the legitimate
receiver and Ne antennas at the eavesdropper is given by (see Fig. 1),
Yi = HXi +W1,i (1)
Zi = GXi +W2,i (2)
where Xi ∈ RNt is the channel input, Yi ∈ RNr is the legitimate receiver’s channel output,
and Zi ∈ RNe is the eavesdropper’s channel output at channel use i; W1,i and W2,i are
independent Gaussian random vectorsN (0, I). The channel matrices of legitimate receiverH and
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Fig. 1. Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with receiver-side power constraint.
the eavesdropperG are real-valued matrices of dimensions Nr×Nt and Ne×Nt, respectively, and
are fixed and known to all entities. The transmitter encodes a message W picked from a discrete
message set W to a codeword Xn over n channel uses via a stochastic encoder f : W → Xn.
The channel input is constrained by the usual maximum average power constraint [25], [26]:
1
n
n∑
i=1
tr(XiX
T
i ) ≤ P (3)
In this paper, we consider minimum and maximum power constraints at the receivers. In the
initial part of the paper, we consider a minimum power constraint at the eavesdropper only as:
1
n
n∑
i=1
tr(ZiZ
T
i ) ≥ E (4)
As usual, see [25], [26], the actual power constraints in (3) and (4) will be reflected in the single-
letter capacity expressions in the sequel as expectations, i.e., tr(E[XXT ]) ≤ P and tr(E[ZZT ]) ≥
E. In addition, for all ǫn > 0, we have the following asymptotic reliability and secrecy constraints
on W based on n-length observations Yn,Zn at the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively:
P[Wˆ 6= W ] ≤ ǫn, lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W ;Zn) = 0 (5)
where ǫn → 0 as n → ∞, and Wˆ = φ(Yn) is the estimate of the legitimate receiver of the
transmitted message W based on Yn by using a decoder φ(·).
In this case, we have an achievable rate Rs(E, P,H,G) = limn→∞ 1n log |W| if there exists a
code, i.e., a codebook and (f, φ) pair such that constraints (3)-(5) are satisfied. The secrecy capac-
6ity C(E, P,H,G) = supR(E, P,H,G), i.e., the supremum of all achievable rates. Although, we
will determine the secrecy capacity under the maximum transmitter-side power constraint in (3)
and the minimum receiver-side power constraint in (4), we initially characterize C(S1,S2,H,G),
the secrecy capacity, under a general double-sided correlation matrix constraint:
S1  Q  S2 (6)
where Q = E[XXT ] is the channel input correlation matrix, and S1  S2 are given and fixed
positive semi-definite (PSD) matrices, where  denotes the partial ordering of PSD matrices. We
will show in a similar way to [11, Section II.B] that the secrecy capacity with power constraints of
(3)-(4) can be obtained from the secrecy capacity with the more general double-sided correlation
matrix constraint in (6) by maximizing this secrecy capacity over all correlation matrices S1  S2
that lie in the compact set SPE:
SPE = {S  0 : tr(S) ≤ P, tr(GSG
T ) ≥ E˜} (7)
where E˜ = E−Ne. We evaluate the secrecy capacity based on Csiszar-Korner secrecy capacity
expression [5]
Cs = max
V→X→Y,Z
I(V ;Y)− I(V ;Z) (8)
where V carries the message signal and X is the channel input. The maximization is over all
jointly distributed (V,X) that satisfy the Markov chain V → X→ Y,Z and the constraints (3),
(4). Note that although Csiszar-Korner expression is initially given for discrete alphabets, it can
be directly extended to alphabets other than discrete, by including the appropriate cost function
in the maximization problem; see remarks in [5, Section VI]. This extension can be done via
discrete approximations in [27, Chapter 3] and [28, Chapter 7].
The main result of this paper is the exact characterization of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO
wiretap channel under the maximum transmitter-side power constraint in (3) and the minimum
receiver-side power constraint in (4). This result is stated in Theorem 1 below. We dedicate
Section III for the achievability proof and Section IV for the converse proof of this theorem. In
Section V, we extend this basic proof technique to the cases of: minimum receiver-side power
constraints at both receivers; maximum receiver-side powe
7(classical BC); and double-sided secrecy constraints (BCCM).
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel with a transmitter-side power
constraint P and a receiver-side power constraint E, C(E, P,H,G), is given as
C(E, P,H,G) = max
Q0,µ
1
2
log |I+HQHT | −
1
2
log |I+GQGT |
s.t. tr(Q+ µµT ) ≤ P, tr(G(Q+ µµT )GT ) ≥ E˜ (9)
where E˜ = E − Ne. This secrecy capacity is achieved by X ∼ N (µ,Q), i.e., with a mean but
no channel prefixing. Alternatively, the secrecy capacity, C(E, P,H,G), is also given as
C(E, P,H,G) = max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
|I+H(Q1 +Q2)HT |
|I+HQ2HT |
−
1
2
log
|I+G(Q1 +Q2)GT |
|I+GQ2GT |
s.t. tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ P, tr(G(Q1 +Q2)G
T ) ≥ E˜ (10)
where X = V +U, with jointly Gaussian V ∼ N (0,Q1) and U ∼ N (0,Q2), and V,U are
independent, i.e., with Gaussian signalling with Gaussian channel prefixing.
III. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEMES
In this section, we provide two coding schemes that achieve the secrecy capacity of the MIMO
wiretap channel with transmitter and receiver-side power constraints given in Theorem 1.
A. Gaussian Coding with Fixed Mean
The first achievable scheme is Gaussian coding with fixed mean, i.e., X ∼ N (µ,Q1). In this
case, the fixed mean does not play a role in evaluating the secrecy capacity except for consuming
part of the overall correlation matrix and only provides the required power level at the receiver
side. Then, we choose V = X, i.e., no channel prefixing. Hence, we have
C(S1,S2,H,G) ≥ max
Q10,µ
I(X;Y)− I(X;Z)
= max
Q10,µ
1
2
log |I+HQ1H
T | −
1
2
log |I+GQ1G
T |
s.t. S1  Q1 + µµ
T  S2 (11)
In the converse proof, in place of µµT , we have a general positive semidefinite matrix Q2. In
order to have a matching feasible coding scheme,Q2 must be constrained to unit-rank correlation
8matrices, as it corresponds to the mean of the transmitted signal. Although, the solution of Q2 is
generally not unit-rank for arbitrary correlation matrices S1,S2, we show in the following lemma
that for the special case of a maximum transmitter-side power constraint P and a minimum
receiver-side power constraint E, the solution is guaranteed to be of unit-rank, and hence the
mean based coding scheme is feasible.
Lemma 1 The coding scheme X ∼ N (V(Q∗2),Q∗1) is achievable for the wiretap channel under
the transmitter-side power constraint P and the receiver-side power constraint E given that
the matrix GTG has a unique maximum eigenvalue. The secrecy rate is characterized by the
following optimization problem:
max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log |I+HQ1H
T | −
1
2
log |I+GQ1G
T |
s.t. tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ P, tr(G(Q1 +Q2)G
T ) ≥ E˜ (12)
where Q∗1,Q∗2 are the optimal correlation matrices for (12) and V(Q∗2) denotes the unique
eigenvector of matrix Q∗2 with a non-zero eigenvalue.
Proof: We note thatQ2 does not appear in the objective function; it only appears in the constraint
set. Therefore, its only role is to enlarge the feasible set for Q1 subject to some power constraint
P˜ , where P˜ ≤ P . Thus, Q2 must be chosen such that, when the first constraint of (12) is fixed,
it maximizes the feasible set for Q1 in the second constraint, i.e., Q2 must be the solution of
max
Q20
tr(GQ2G
T ) s.t. tr(Q2) = P˜ (13)
The eigenvector decomposition for Q2, which is symmetric, is
Q2 =
r∑
i=1
λiqiq
T
i (14)
where r, λi, qi are the rank, the ith eigenvalue and the corresponding orthonormal eigenvector
of Q2, respectively. Thus, we can write the constraint as tr(Q2) =
∑r
i=1 λi = P˜ . Moreover, the
objective function can be written as
tr(GQ2G
T ) = tr
(
G
(
r∑
i=1
λiqiq
T
i
)
GT
)
=
r∑
i=1
λi‖Gqi‖
2 (15)
9Hence, the optimization problem in (13) can be written as
max
λi,qi
r∑
i=1
λi‖Gqi‖
2 s.t.
r∑
i=1
λi = P˜ (16)
which is a linear program in λi. The optimum solution is λm = P˜ , and λi = 0 for i 6= m, where
m = argmax
i
‖Gqi‖
2 (17)
Hence, the optimal solution for this problem is to beam-form all the available power P˜ to
the direction of the largest ‖Gqi‖2. This solution is unique if GTG has a unique maximum
eigenvalue. Otherwise a unit-rank solution for Q2 is not guaranteed. In this case, Q2 = P˜qmqTm,
i.e., it is unit-rank with eigenvector µ =
√
P˜qm, and the problem is feasible. 
We remark that the same capacity expression in (12) can be realized by letting X = V+U,
where V ∼ N (0,Q1) is the message-carrying signal and U ∼ N (0,Q2) is the energy-carrying
signal that is known causally at both Bob and Eve, so that it can be cancelled prior to information
decoding. We note that, with this coding scheme any covariance matrix Q2 can be realized, and
therefore Lemma 1 is not needed with this coding scheme, i.e., that the converse and achievability
match for all S1,S2. However, if Q2 is optimized for this scheme as well for given P,E, then
the optimum Q2 is still unit-rank. If the problem is considered under covariance constraints, as
opposed to power constraints, unit-rank requirement of the mean based scheme can be removed
by sending known Gaussian signals instead, at the cost of extra overhead of identifying U
causally at Bob and Eve.
B. Gaussian Coding with Gaussian Artificial Noise
The second achievable scheme is Gaussian coding with Gaussian artificial noise. In this case,
we choose X = V +U, where V, U are independent and V ∼ N (0,Q1) and U ∼ N (0,Q2).
Here, V carries the message, X is the channel input, and U is the artificial noise (or cooperative
jamming [13]) signal. In this case, we use channel prefixing, henceV 6= X. The extra randomness
U is sent by the transmitter to provide extra noise floor at both receivers, and confuses the
eavesdropper. The added significance of this artificial noise in our problem is to provide a
suitable level of received power at the receiver, i.e., we utilize the artificial noise as a source of
10
power. In this case, the achievable secrecy rate satisfies
C(S1,S2,H,G) ≥ max
Q1,Q20
I(V;Y)− I(V;Z)
= max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
|I+H(Q1 +Q2)HT |
|I+HQ2HT |
−
1
2
log
|I+G(Q1 +Q2)GT |
|I+GQ2GT |
s.t. S1  Q1 +Q2  S2 (18)
IV. CONVERSE PROOF
In this section, we prove the reverse implication using the channel enhancement technique [10],
[11]. We will consider the case of S2  S1 ≻ 0 and the aligned MIMO setting which means
that the channel matrices are square and invertible. The general MIMO case follows directly
from the limiting arguments in [10], as the additional receiver-side power constraint is irrelevant
in the limit. The idea of this limiting argument is to perform singular-value decomposition of
the perturbed channels H¯, G¯ [10, Eqn. (37)]. Our result follows by taking the limit of this
perturbation to zero. The argument is introduced in [10, Section II.B] and used for example in
[20, Appendix B.2], [29, Section VII]. Therefore, we focus on the aligned case here. The aligned
MIMO model is obtained by multiplying the input-output relations (1)-(2) by the inverse of the
channel matrices:
Y˜ = X+H−1W1 = X+ W˜1 (19)
Z˜ = X+G−1W2 = X+ W˜2 (20)
where W˜1 and W˜2 are the equivalent zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance
matrices N1 = H−1H−T and N2 = G−1G−T , respectively.
A. Equivalence of a Double-Sided Correlation Matrix Constraint
For the MIMO broadcast and wiretap channels under a transmitter-side maximum power
constraint, references [10], [11] showed that it is sufficient to prove the converse under a
maximum correlation constraint on the channel input. We first note here that in our case with
maximum transmitter-side and minimum receiver-side power constraints, a single correlation
constraint on the channel input, i.e., Q  S, is not sufficient. Next, we show the equivalence
of solving our problem with a double-sided correlation matrix constraint on the channel input,
11
i.e., S1  Q  S2. Then, our problem can be solved in two stages: the inner problem finds the
capacity under fixed correlation matrices S1 and S2 constraints, and the outer problem finds the
optimal S1,S2 ∈ SPE in (7). Finally, we modify the original channel enhancement technique
[10], [11] to prove the optimality of the achievable schemes presented in the previous section.
We first note that solving the problem for Q  S, where S ∈ SPE is insufficient. Consider
solving the secrecy capacity under maximum transmitter-side and minimum receiver-side power
constraints in two stages, first, solving the problem under a fixed correlation matrix S, and then
choosing the optimal S ∈ SPE, i.e.,
max
S∈SPE
max
QS
Rs(Q,H,G) (21)
where Rs(Q,H,G) is the achievable secure rate upon using correlation matrix Q. Since Q  S,
we have GQGT  GSGT and hence tr(GQGT ) ≤ tr(GSGT ). Then, although any S ∈ SPE
satisfies the minimum receiver-side power constraint, i.e., tr(GSGT ) ≥ E˜, the input correlation
matrix Q is not guaranteed to satisfy tr(GQGT ) ≥ E˜. Hence, the single correlation constraint
is not sufficient for solving problems involving minimum receiver-side power constraints.
Lemma 2 Since SPE is a compact set of PSD matrices, and C(S1,S2,H,G) is continuous with
respect to S2, we have
C(E, P,H,G) = max
S1,S2∈SPE ,S1S2
C(S1,S2,H,G) (22)
Proof: We follow and extend the proof technique in [11, Lemma 1] to the case of double-
sided covariance matrices. We define the wiretap code C(n,S, R, ǫ) as a codebook, where the
codewords {Xni }2
nR
i=1 are such that S = 12nR
∑2nR
i=1 X
n
iX
nT
i , and accompanying encoding and
decoding functions (f, φ), such that P(φ(f(W )) 6= W ) ≤ ǫ. The decoder φ can be taken as the
maximum likelihood decoder.
To see
C(E, P,H,G) ≥ max
S1,S2∈SPE ,S1S2
C(S1,S2,H,G) (23)
we note that for any S1  Q  S2 where S1,S2 ∈ SPE , we have Q ∈ SPE, i.e., every Q
in the feasible set of the optimization problem on the right hand side belongs to the feasible
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set of the optimization problem C(E, P,H,G). Hence, C(E, P,H,G) is at least as large as
maxS1,S2∈SPE ,S1S2 C(S1,S2,H,G).
To see
C(E, P,H,G) ≤ max
S1,S2∈SPE ,S1S2
C(S1,S2,H,G) (24)
we should prove that C(E, P,H,G) = C(S1,S2,H,G) for some S1,S2 ∈ SPE [11]. If R =
C(E, P,H,G) is achievable, then there exists an infinite sequence of codes C(ni,S0i , R, ǫi),
i = 1, . . . with rate R and decreasing probability of error ǫi → 0 as i→∞. Choose S1  S0i ,
∀i and S1 ∈ SPE. We note that the choice of S1 is completely arbitrary, thus without loss
of generality, we can choose it to be the first element in the sequence, i.e., S01 . As SPE is
compact [30], [31], for any infinite sequence of points in SPE, there must exist a sub-sequence
that converges to a point S0 ∈ SPE . Hence, for any arbitrary δ > 0, we can find an increasing
subsequence i(k) such that S1  S0i(k)  S0 + δI.
This implies that we can find a sequence of codes C(nk,S0+δI, R, ǫk) with S0 ∈ SPE, S0  S1
achieving small probability of error. Therefore, for every δ > 0, we have R = C(S1,S0 +
δI,H,G). Since C(S1,S0+ δI,H,G) is continuous, see Appendix A, with respect to its second
argument, we have that every ǫ-ball around R contains C(S1,S0,H,G), since for every ǫ > 0,
there exists δ > 0 such that C(S1,S0 + δI,H,G)− C(S1,S0,H,G) < ǫ as continuity asserts.
Therefore R is a limit point of C(S1,S0,H,G) and hence C(E, P,H,G) = C(S1,S0,H,G).
This limit point belongs to SPE since it is closed. 
B. Converse Proof for Gaussian Coding with Fixed Mean
First, we begin with writing the equivalent optimization problem corresponding to the achiev-
ability scheme in the aligned MIMO case with Gaussian coding X ∼ N (V(Q∗2),Q∗1):
max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
|Q1 +N1|
|N1|
−
1
2
log
|Q1 +N2|
|N2|
s.t. Q1 +Q2  S1, Q1 +Q2  S2 (25)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem can be written as:
L = log
|Q1 +N2|
|N2|
− log
|Q1 +N1|
|N1|
− tr(Q1M1)− tr(Q2M2)− tr((Q1 +Q2 − S1)M3)
13
+ tr((Q1 +Q2 − S2)M4) (26)
where M1  0,M2  0,M3  0 and M4  0 are the Lagrange multipliers for each constraint.
The corresponding KKT complementary slackness conditions are:
Q∗1M1 = 0, Q
∗
2M2 = 0 (27)
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 − S1)M3 = 0 (28)
(S2 −Q
∗
1 −Q
∗
2)M4 = 0 (29)
and the KKT optimality conditions for Q∗1 and Q∗2 are:
(Q∗1 +N2)
−1 − (Q∗1 +N1)
−1 −M1 −M3 +M4 = 0 (30)
−M2 −M3 +M4 = 0 (31)
Now, using (30) and (31), we can construct an enhanced channel that can serve as an upper
bound for the original legitimate receiver’s channel, while the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded
with respect to it. The covariance of the enhanced channel is chosen as N˜ such that
(Q∗1 +N2)
−1 +M2 = (Q
∗
1 +N1)
−1 +M1 = (Q
∗
1 + N˜)
−1 (32)
Using this definition of the enhanced channel, we explore various characteristics of N˜.
First, to prove the validity of the covariance matrix N˜, we note that
N˜ = [(Q∗1 +N1)
−1 +M1]
−1 −Q∗1 (33)
= (I+N1M1)
−1(Q∗1 +N1)−Q
∗
1 (34)
= (I+N1M1)
−1[(Q∗1 +N1)− (I+N1M1)Q
∗
1] (35)
= (I+N1M1)
−1N1 = (N
−1
1 +M1)
−1  0 (36)
and hence the covariance matrix of the constructed enhanced channel is positive semi-definite,
and therefore it is a feasible covariance matrix.
Next, we want to show that the constructed channel is enhanced with respect to N1, i.e.,
N1  N˜. To show that we note from (36) that N˜ = (N−11 +M1)−1 and hence, N1  N˜. Similarly
by considering (Q∗1+N2)−1+M2 = (Q∗1+N˜)−1 we note that N2  N˜. Hence, we conclude that
14
the enhanced channel has better channel conditions than the original legitimate user’s channel,
therefore, the constructed channel is an upper bound for the legitimate receiver. Moreover, the
eavesdropper’s channel is degraded with respect to the constructed channel. Consequently the
secrecy capacity of the enhanced channel is known. In other words, we have Y˜ = X+W˜ such
that W˜ ∼ N (0, N˜) and X→ Y˜ → Y and X→ Y˜ → Z.
In order to have a meaningful upper bound, we need to show that the rate is preserved between
the original problem and the constructed channel. To show that, we have
(Q∗1 + N˜)
−1N˜ = (Q∗1 + N˜)
−1(N˜+Q∗1 −Q
∗
1) (37)
= I− (Q∗1 + N˜)
−1Q∗1 (38)
= I− [(Q∗1 +N1)
−1 +M1]Q
∗
1 (39)
= I− (Q∗1 +N1)
−1Q∗1 = (Q
∗
1 +N1)
−1N1 (40)
where (39) follows from the definition of the enhanced channel and (40) follows from the
complementary slackness condition (27). Therefore, we have
|N˜+Q∗1|
|N˜|
=
|N1 +Q∗1|
|N1|
(41)
To show a similar rate preservation argument for the degraded channel N2, we will need the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 The optimal covariance matrix for the achievable scheme with Gaussian signaling
with a fixed mean Q∗1 satisfies (S2 −Q∗1)M2 = 0.
Proof: We return to the KKT conditions. Considering the correlation constraint, three cases can
possibly occur. The first case: the correlation constraint is satisfied with equality, consequently
S2 − Q∗1 = Q
∗
2. In this case, (S2 − Q∗1)M2 = Q∗2M2 = 0 from (27). The second case: the
correlation constraint is strictly loose, i.e, Q1 +Q2 ≺ S2. In this case, we can define a matrix
∆ = S2 −Q∗1 −Q
∗
2 ≻ 0, and therefore ∆ is a full-rank matrix. Thus, M4 = 0 and from (31),
we have M2 = −M3. The matrices M2, M3 are both positive semi-definite matrices. Therefore,
we must have M2 = M3 = 0. Finally, the third case: the correlation constraint is partially
loose, that is, we have ∆ = S2 −Q1 −Q2  0, hence ∆ is not a full-rank matrix. We define
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Σ = S2 − S1 ≻ 0, i.e., S1 = S2 − Σ. In this case, we sum the KKT conditions (28) and (29)
to obtain the following implications:
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2)(M3 −M4)− S1M3 + S2M4 = 0 (42)
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2)(M3 −M4)− S2M3 +ΣM3 + S2M4 = 0 (43)
(S2 −Q
∗
1 −Q
∗
2)(M4 −M3) = −ΣM3 (44)
(S2 −Q
∗
1 −Q
∗
2)M2 = −ΣM3 (45)
(S2 −Q
∗
1)M2 = −ΣM3 (46)
where (45) follows from (31), and (46) follows from (27). Since (S2−Q∗1)M2  0 andΣM3  0,
or at least (S2 −Q∗1)M2 and ΣM3 have the same number of non-negative eigenvalues of M2
and M3, respectively [32], the only way to satisfy (46) is to have all the eigenvalues of both
matrices equal zero, i.e., (S2 −Q∗1)M2 = −ΣM3 = 0. Hence, we conclude that for all three
cases we have (S2 −Q∗1)M2 = 0 and this completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
Hence, using Lemma 3, we write:
(N˜+ S2)(Q
∗
1 + N˜)
−1 = (S2 −Q
∗
1)(Q
∗
1 + N˜)
−1 + I (47)
= (S2 −Q
∗
1)[(Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 +M2] + I (48)
= (S2 −Q
∗
1)(Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 + I (49)
= [(N2 + S2)− (Q
∗
1 +N2)](Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 + I (50)
= (N2 + S2)(Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 (51)
where (48) follows from the definition of the enhanced channel (32), and (49) follows from
Lemma 3. Hence, we have:
|S2 + N˜|
|S2 +N2|
=
|Q∗1 + N˜|
|Q∗1 +N2|
(52)
We upper bound the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel with a receiver-side power
constraint by the secrecy capacity of the enhanced channel. Since S2 ∈ SPE , S2 satisfies the
receiver power constraint for the enhanced channel. Hence, the receiver constraint is valid with
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the upper bounding argument. The secrecy capacity of the enhanced channel C˜s is given by
C˜s =
1
2
log
|S2 + N˜|
|N˜|
−
1
2
log
|S2 +N2|
|N2|
(53)
=
1
2
log
|S2 + N˜|
|S2 +N2|
·
|N2|
|N˜|
(54)
=
1
2
log
|Q∗1 + N˜|
|Q∗1 +N2|
·
|N2|
|N˜|
(55)
=
1
2
log
|Q∗1 + N˜|
|N˜|
−
1
2
log
|Q∗1 +N2|
|N2|
(56)
=
1
2
log
|Q∗1 +N1|
|N1|
−
1
2
log
|Q∗1 +N2|
|N2|
= C(S1,S2,H,G) (57)
where (55) follows from (52), and (57) follows from (41), completing the converse proof for
the case of Gaussian signalling with a fixed mean.
C. Converse Proof for Gaussian Coding with Gaussian Artificial Noise
In this section, we follow a similar channel enhancement technique as in Section IV-B. The
optimization problem corresponding to the Gaussian coding scheme with artificial noise is:
max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
|Q1 +Q2 +N1|
|Q2 +N1|
−
1
2
log
|Q1 +Q2 +N2|
|Q2 +N2|
s.t. Q1 +Q2  S1, Q1 +Q2  S2 (58)
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem is given by:
L = log
|Q1 +Q2 +N2|
|Q2 +N2|
− log
|Q1 +Q2 +N1|
|Q2 +N1|
− tr((Q1 +Q2 − S1)M3)
− tr(Q1M1)− tr(Q2M2) + tr((Q1 +Q2 − S2)M4) (59)
The complementary slackness conditions (27)-(29) are still the same due to the same set of
constraints for both problems (58) and (25). The KKT optimality condition for Q∗1 and Q∗2 are:
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 − (Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 −M1 −M3 +M4 = 0 (60)
(Q∗1+Q
∗
2+N2)
−1−(Q∗2+N2)
−1−(Q∗1+Q
∗
2+N1)
−1+(Q∗2+N1)
−1−M2−M3+M4 = 0 (61)
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Using (60), we can write (61) as:
M1 − (Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 + (Q∗2 +N1)
−1 −M2 = 0 (62)
In this case, we again construct an enhanced channel with similar steps as in Section IV-B. The
enhanced channel is constructed as:
(Q∗2 +N1)
−1 +M1 = (Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 +M2 = (Q
∗
2 + N˜)
−1 (63)
which is the same as in the previous section. Therefore, it follows that N˜  0, N˜  N1,
N˜  N2. Similarly, we can prove that the rate is preserved for the eavesdropper (as in the set
of equations (37)-(41) with Q∗2 instead of Q∗1), i.e.,
|N˜+Q∗2|
|N˜|
=
|N2 +Q∗2|
|N2|
(64)
To prove the rate preservation for the legitimate receiver, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 4 To achieve a positive secrecy rate using Gaussian coding with artificial noise, S2
must be fully used, i.e., S2 = Q∗1+Q∗2, and the optimal covariance matrix used for the artificial
noise component, Q∗2, satisfies (S2 −Q∗2)M1 = 0.
Proof: We start by proving the first part of the lemma by contradiction. Assume that a positive
secrecy rate can be achieved using artificial noise, and S2 is partially used. Then, we have two
cases. The first case: ∆ = S2 −Q∗1 −Q∗2 ≻ 0. Hence, ∆ is a full-rank matrix, then M4 = 0.
From (60), we can write (Q∗1 + Q∗2 + N1)−1 +M1 +M3 = (Q∗1 + Q∗2 + N2)−1 and hence,
(Q∗1 + Q
∗
2 + N1)
−1  (Q∗1 + Q
∗
2 + N2)
−1
, which results in N2  N1. This means that the
legitimate channel is degraded with respect to the eavesdropper channel, and hence, no positive
secrecy rate can be achieved. This contradicts our assumption. The second case: ∆ is not full-
rank. Due to the similarity of the complementary slackness conditions for the artificial noise and
the Gaussian coding with fixed mean settings, we have also (44), and from (60), we have
M4 −M3 = (Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 − (Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 +M1 (65)
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substituting this in (44), we have the following implications:
∆(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 −∆(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 +∆M1 = −ΣM3 (66)
∆[(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 −∆(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1] = ∆M1 +ΣM3 (67)
Then, [(Q∗1 + Q∗2 + N2)−1 − (Q∗1 + Q∗2 + N1)]−1  0 to have (67) hold true [33], and then
we have N2  N1 as in the previous case, which also contradicts the assumption of having a
positive secrecy rate. Hence, Q∗1 +Q∗2 = S2. For the second part of the lemma, we now have
S2−Q∗2 = Q
∗
1, and from the complementary slackness condition Q∗1M1 = 0. Then, we conclude
that (S2 −Q∗2)M1 = 0, completing the proof of Lemma 4. 
Using Lemma 4, we can prove rate preservation for the legitimate receiver as follows:
(N˜+ S2)(Q
∗
2 + N˜)
−1 = (S2 −Q
∗
2)(Q
∗
2 + N˜)
−1 + I (68)
= (S2 −Q
∗
2)[(Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 +M1] + I (69)
= (S2 −Q
∗
2)(Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 + I (70)
= [(N1 + S2)− (Q
∗
2 +N1)](Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 + I (71)
= (N1 + S2)(Q
∗
2 +N1)
−1 (72)
where (69) follows from the definition of the enhanced channel (63), and (70) follows from
Lemma 4. Therefore, we have:
|S2 + N˜|
|Q∗2 + N˜|
=
|S2 +N1|
|Q∗2 +N1|
(73)
Hence, the secrecy capacity of the enhanced channel is given by:
C˜s =
1
2
log
|S2 + N˜|
|N˜|
−
1
2
log
|S2 +N2|
|N2|
(74)
=
1
2
log
|S2 + N˜|
|S2 +N2|
·
|N2|
|N˜|
(75)
=
1
2
log
|S2 + N˜|
|S2 +N2|
·
|Q∗2 +N2|
|Q∗2 + N˜|
(76)
=
1
2
log
|S2 + N˜|
|Q∗2 + N˜|
·
|Q∗2 +N2|
|S2 +N2|
(77)
=
1
2
log
|S2 +N1|
|Q∗2 +N1|
·
|Q∗2 +N2|
|S2 +N2|
(78)
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=
1
2
log
|S2 +N1|
|Q∗2 +N1|
−
1
2
log
|S2 +N2|
|Q∗2 +N2|
(79)
=
1
2
log
|Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N1|
|Q∗2 +N1|
−
1
2
log
|Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2|
|Q∗2 +N2|
= C(S1,S2,H,G) (80)
where (76) follows from (64), (78) follows from (73), and (80) follows from Q∗1 +Q∗2 = S2,
completing the converse proof for the case of Gaussian signalling with Gaussian artificial noise.
V. EXTENSIONS TO RELATED CHANNEL MODELS
A. Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channel Under Dual Minimum Receiver-Side Power Constraints
In this section, we consider the case where we impose dual receiver-side minimum power con-
straints, i.e., receiver-side power constraints both on the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
Then, we have the following constraint in addition to the constraints in (3) and (4):
tr(E[YYT ]) ≥ E2 (81)
where E2 is the minimum power level that should be delivered to the legitimate receiver. The
following theorem characterizes the secrecy capacity of this model.
Theorem 2 The secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel with a transmitter-side power
constraint P and dual receiver-side power constraints E1, E2, C(E1, E2, P,H,G), is given as
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) = max
Q0,µ
1
2
log |I+HQHT | −
1
2
log |I+GQGT |
s.t. tr(Q+ µµT ) ≤ P
tr(G(Q+ µµT )GT ) ≥ E˜1, tr(H(Q+ µµ
T )HT ) ≥ E˜2 (82)
where E˜1 = E1 − Ne, and E˜2 = E −Nr. This secrecy capacity is achieved by X ∼ N (µ,Q),
i.e., with a mean but no channel prefixing. Alternatively, C(E1, E2, P,H,G) is also given as
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) = max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
|I+H(Q1 +Q2)HT |
|I+HQ2HT |
−
1
2
log
|I+G(Q1 +Q2)GT |
|I+GQ2GT |
s.t. tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ P
tr(G(Q1 +Q2)G
T ) ≥ E˜1, tr(H(Q1 +Q2)H
T ) ≥ E˜2 (83)
where X = V+U, with jointly Gaussian V ∼ N (0,Q1) and U ∼ N (0,Q2), where U,V are
independent, i.e., Gaussian signalling with Gaussian channel prefixing.
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Proof: The proof relies on verifying that the double-sided correlation matrix constraint con-
structed in Section IV-A is sufficient for this case also. First, we define the set SPE1E2 as:
SPE1E2 = {S  0 : tr(S) ≤ P, tr(GSG
T ) ≥ E˜1, tr(HSH
T ) ≥ E˜2} (84)
To show the direct implication
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) ≥ max
S1,S2∈SPE1E2 ,S1S2
C(S1,S2,H,G) (85)
we note that for any Q such that S1  Q  S1 where S1,S2 ∈ SPE1E2 , we have tr(Q) ≤
tr(S2) ≤ P , tr(GQGT ) ≥ tr(GS1GT ) ≥ E1 and tr(HQHT ) ≥ tr(HS1HT ) ≥ E2. Conse-
quently, Q ∈ SPE1E2 , i.e., the feasible set under S1,S2 ∈ SPE1E2 is a subset of the feasible set
under P,E1, E2 constraints. Moreover, SPE1E2 ⊆ SPE defined in Section II, and hence SPE1E2
is also a compact set. Hence the implication
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) ≤ max
S1,S2∈SPE1E2 ,S1S2
C(S1,S2,H,G) (86)
can be proved by following the reverse implication (23) of the proof of Lemma 2 for the compact
set SPE1E2 , we can show that:
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) = max
S1,S2∈SPE1E2 ,S1S2
C(S1,S2,H,G) (87)
Then, the inner problem under the dual receiver-side power constraints is identical to its counter-
part under a single receiver-side power constraint on the eavesdropper side only. Consequently,
achievability schemes of mean based and artificial noise based signalling are optimal for the
dual receiver-side minimum power constraints.
It only remains to show that the achievable rates with Gaussian signalling with fixed mean
match the converse, i.e., that when the covariance matrix representing the mean is left unrestricted
for converse purposes, at the optimal, it takes a unit-rank so that it can be implemented with a
mean vector in the achievability. That is, we need to show that Lemma 1 extends to the current
setting under P,E1, E2 constraints. To show this, as a generalization of (13), we need to solve:
max
Q20
α1tr(GQ2G
T ) + α2tr(HQ2H
T ) s.t. tr(Q2) = P˜ (88)
21
This optimization problem is equivalent to:
max
λi,qi
r∑
i=1
λi
(
α1‖Gqi‖
2 + α2‖Hqi‖
2
)
s.t.
r∑
i=1
λi = P˜ (89)
which has a beam-forming optimal solution of assigning all P˜ to qm such that
m = argmax
i
α1‖Gqi‖
2 + α2‖Hqi‖
2 (90)
and hence the optimal Q2 is unit-rank and the mean-based signalling is feasible. 
B. Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channel Under Maximum Receiver-Side Power Constraints
In this section, we consider the MIMO wiretap channel under maximum receiver-side power
constraints. This generalizes Gastpar’s problem [1] to include a secrecy requirement. In this case,
we limit the interference at both receivers instead of maintaining the received power levels at
both receivers as in Section II. Then, we impose the following constraints together with (3):
tr(E[ZZT ]) ≤ E1, tr(E[YY
T ]) ≤ E2 (91)
Theorem 3 The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel with a transmitter-side power
constraint P and maximum receiver-side power constraints E1, E2, C(E1, E2, P,H,G), is
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) = max
Q0
1
2
log |I+HQHT | −
1
2
log |I+GQGT |
s.t. tr(Q) ≤ P, tr(GQGT ) ≤ E˜1, tr(HQH
T ) ≤ E˜2 (92)
This secrecy capacity is achieved by X ∼ N (0,Q), i.e., neither mean or channel prefixing is
required.
Proof: Similar to the previous section, we construct a suitable correlation matrix set S ′PE1E2 as:
S ′PE1E2 = {S  0 : tr(S) ≤ P, tr(GSG
T ) ≤ E˜1, tr(HSH
T ) ≤ E˜2} (93)
Now, we show that, using a single-sided correlation matrix constraint Q  S is sufficient for
maximum receiver-side power constraints, unlike the double-sided correlation constraint that was
necessary for minimum receiver-side power constraints so far. Since, for all Q  S, we have
tr(Q) ≤ tr(S) ≤ P , tr(GQGT ) ≤ tr(GSGT ) ≤ E˜1 and tr(HQHT ) ≤ tr(HSHT ) ≤ E˜2, we
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thus have Q ∈ S ′PE1E2 . Moreover, the set S
′
PE1E2
is closed and bounded and hence compact.
Consequently, we can find a sequence of codes C(nk,S0+δI, R, ǫk) with S0 ∈ S ′PE1E2 , achieving
small probability of error, that has a limit point of C(S0,H,G) and hence
C(E1, E2, P,H,G) = max
S∈S′
PE1E2
C(S,H,G) (94)
Consequently, the inner problem under a correlation matrix constraint for the wiretap channel
with maximum receiver-side power limitations is identical to the inner problem for the classical
wiretap channel without the extra maximum receiver-side power constraints. Hence, the classical
Gaussian coding with zero-mean and no channel-prefixing is optimal. 
C. Gaussian MIMO Broadcast Channel Under Minimum Receiver-Side Power Constraints
In this section, we consider the MIMO BC with no secrecy constraints under minimum receiver-
side power constraints. In this setting, the transmitter is required to communicate messages
simultaneously and reliably with the largest possible rate, and at the same time, deliver the
minimum required powers to the receivers: tr(E[ZZT ]) ≥ E1, tr(E[YYT ]) ≥ E2. The problem
without the receiver-side constraints is solved by Weingarten et. al. [11]. The rate region is
achieved using DPC along with time sharing. We show in the following theorem that the DPC
is optimal even after imposing the receiver-side power constraints.
Theorem 4 The capacity region of a MIMO broadcast channel with a transmitter-side power
constraint P and minimum receiver-side power constraints E1, E2, C(E1, E2, P,H,G), is given
by the DPC region, which is the convex hull of the union of two regions RDPC1 and RDPC2 ,
corresponding to the two orders of encoding, given as:
RDPC1 =
{
(R1, R2) : R1 ≤
1
2
log |I+HQ1H
T |, R2 ≤
1
2
log
|I+G(Q1 +Q2)GT |
|I+GQ1GT |
}
RDPC2 =
{
(R1, R2) : R1 ≤
1
2
log
|I+H(Q1 +Q2)HT |
|I+HQ2HT |
, R2 ≤
1
2
log |I+GQ2G
T |
}
(95)
both of which subject to
tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ P, tr(G(Q1 +Q2)G
T ) ≥ E˜1, tr(H(Q1 +Q2)H
T ) ≥ E˜2 (96)
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Proof: We consider, without loss of generality, the region of rates achieved by RDPC1 . We first
note that, due to the presence of the minimum receiver-side power constraints, we need to
consider a double-sided correlation matrix constraint S1  Q1 +Q2  S2, for any fixed S1,S2
in SPE1E2 in (84). Following the original channel enhancement proof of the aligned MIMO
(not necessarily degraded) BC (AMBC) in [11], it suffices to prove that under a double-sided
correlation matrix constraint S1  Q1+Q2  S2, there exists an enhanced aligned degraded BC
(ADBC) such that for α1 ≤ α2, noise covariances of the enhanced channel satisfy the covariance
increment N˜1  N˜2 and supporting hyperplane preservation.
First, the achievable DPC rates in the aligned case with the encoding order in RDPC1 are
max
Q1,Q20
α1 ·
1
2
log
|Q1 +N1|
|N1|
+ α2 ·
1
2
log
|Q1 +Q2 +N2|
|Q1 +N2|
s.t. Q1 +Q2  S1, Q1 +Q2  S2 (97)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L =α1 ·
1
2
log
|Q1 +N1|
|N1|
+ α2 ·
1
2
log
|Q1 +Q2 +N2|
|Q1 +N2|
+ tr(Q1M1) + tr(Q2M2)
+ tr((Q1 +Q2 − S1)M3)− tr((Q1 +Q2 − S2)M4) (98)
The KKT optimality conditions for Q∗1,Q∗2 are:
α1
2
(Q∗1 +N1)
−1 +
α2
2
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 −
α2
2
(Q∗1 +N2)
−1 +M1 +M3 −M4 = 0 (99)
α2
2
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)
−1 +M2 +M3 −M4 = 0 (100)
and the complementary slackness conditions are as in (27)-(29). From (100) and (99), we have:
α1
2
(Q∗1 +N1)
−1 +M1 =
α2
2
(Q∗1 +N2)
−1 +M2 (101)
Consequently, we construct the enhanced channels as:
α1
2
(Q∗1 +N1)
−1 +M1 =
α1
2
(Q∗1 + N˜1)
−1 (102)
α2
2
(Q∗1 +N2)
−1 +M2 =
α2
2
(Q∗1 + N˜2)
−1 (103)
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Then, N˜1  N1 and N˜2  N2, and thus, the constructed channels are enhanced. We need show
that the enhanced BC is degraded in favor of receiver 1. Since α1 ≤ α2, from (101)-(103),
(Q∗1 + N˜1)
−1 =
α2
α1
(Q∗1 + N˜2)
−1  (Q∗1 + N˜2)
−1 (104)
and hence N˜1  N˜2. Moreover, we have the rate preservation relation of receiver 1,
|Q∗1 + N˜1|
|N˜1|
=
|Q∗1 +N1|
|N1|
(105)
and the rate preservation for user 2 can be shown as:
(Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 + N˜2)(Q
∗
1 + N˜2)
−1 = Q∗2(Q
∗
1 + N˜2)
−1 + I (106)
= Q∗2[(Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 +
2
α2
M2] + I (107)
= Q∗2(Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 + I (108)
= (Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2)(Q
∗
1 +N2)
−1 (109)
leading to:
|Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 + N˜2|
|Q∗1 + N˜2|
=
|Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 +N2|
|Q∗1 +N2|
(110)
Hence, we have an enhanced ADBC whose rate region is achieved by a Gaussian codebook
and use full S2 [11]. Additionally, from (105) and (110), we conclude that the rate region of the
original AMBC coincides with the optimal Gaussian rate region RG(S2, N˜1, N˜2) of the enhanced
ADBC. To complete the proof, we need to show that the supporting hyperplane {(R1, R2) :
α1R1+α2R2 = b} is also a supporting hyperplane for the Gaussian rate region of the enhanced
ADBC RG(S2, N˜1, N˜2), i.e., that
∑2
i=1 αiR
G
i (Q1,Q2, N˜1, N˜2) is maximized by the Q∗i that
solves the AMBC problem. The proof of this follows from [11]. 
We note that the related work [34] considers a MISO BC with multiple receivers, where each
receiver requires either data or energy, but not both. The energy-requiring users are satisfied by the
transmission of pseudo-random signals, that are known to all receivers, which can be subtracted
out for communication purposes with the information-requiring users. The information-requiring
users are served with a DPC scheme, which is optimal in that case due to [11], as energy transfer
does not interact with data transfer. The emphasis in [34] is the optimization of the system for this
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transmission scheme. In our work, all users require both data and information simultaneously.
We prove by developing a suitable channel enhancement method using double-sided correlation
matrix constraints that DPC is optimal for this system.
D. Gaussian MIMO Broadcast Channel with Confidential messages Under Minimum Receiver-
Side Power Constraints
In this section, we consider the MIMO BCCM where we transmit a message to each receiver
secret from the other. In this setting, the transmitter is required to communicate messages reliably,
securely and at the same time deliver minimum amounts of energy E1 and E2 to the receivers.
The problem without receiver-side power constraints was solved in [20], and it was shown that
secure DPC (S-DPC) attains the secrecy capacity region. We show in the following theorem that
S-DPC is optimal in the presence of receiver-side power constraints as well.
Theorem 5 The secrecy capacity region of a MIMO broadcast channel with a transmitter-
side power constraint P and minimum receiver-side power constraints E1, E2 and with secrecy
constraints, C(E1, E2, P,H,G), is given by the S-DPC region,
R1 ≤ max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log |I+HQ1H
T | −
1
2
log |I+GQ1G
T |
R2 ≤ max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
|I+G(Q1 +Q2)GT |
|I+GQ1GT |
−
1
2
log
|I+H(Q1 +Q2)HT |
|I+HQ1HT |
s.t. tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ P
tr(G(Q1 +Q2)G
T ) ≥ E˜1, tr(H(Q1 +Q2)H
T ) ≥ E˜2 (111)
This region is achieved by S-DPC (Gaussian double binning) using jointly Gaussian random
variables (V1,V2)→ X→ (Y,Z) such that V1 = U1+FU2, V2 = U2, X = U1+U2, where
U1 ∼ N (0,Q1), U2 ∼ N (0,Q2) are independent and F = Q1HT (I+HQ1HT )−1H.
Proof: In this case also, we have a double-sided correlation matrix constraint S1  Q1+Q2  S2,
where S1,S2 in SPE1E2 in (84). From Lemma 4, we know that, to have a positive secrecy rate
at receiver 2, we must use the full correlation matrix S2, i.e., Q1 +Q2 = S2. Since the outer
optimization problem chooses S2 from the set SPE1E2 , and X has the covariance Q = Q1+Q2,
the receiver-side power constraints are satisfied. The achievability of the corner point follows
from [20] by using the double binning scheme presented in [35].
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We next need to show that the achievable scheme matches the converse. For receiver 2: From
Theorem 1, noticing that G in this case corresponds to the main channel and H corresponds
to the eavesdropper channel, the achievable rate R2,max in (111) is equal to the secrecy capacity
C(S1,S2,G,H) in (18) proving the converse. For receiver 1: The achievable rate R1,max in (111)
is the same as the secrecy capacity C(S1,S2,H,G) in (11) except for the correlation constraint
S1  Q1 + µµ
T  S2. Recall that, in Section IV-B, we proved the converse for arbitrary Q2,
not necessarily unit-rank. Therefore, using S-DPC encoding scheme induces the required extra
covariance component Q2 that supports the receiver-side constraint. Moreover, we observe that
C(S1,S2,G,H) = C(S1,S2,H,G) +
1
2
log
|I+GS2GT |
|I+HS2HT |
(112)
This implies that Q1 maximizes the secrecy capacities of both users simultaneously. Conse-
quently, the two users can receive the confidential messages at their respective maximum secrecy
rates as individual wiretap channels, i.e., the secrecy rate region is rectangular under the S1,S2
correlation matrix constraints. Hence, the S-DPC scheme is optimal. 
VI. PRACTICAL OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES
In this section, we provide several optimization approaches to evaluate the capacities under
receiver-side power constraints stated in Theorems 1-5. Without loss of generality, we consider
the case of a single minimum receiver-side power constraint in the wiretap channel in Theorem 1.
This is one of the most challenging optimization problems among the results in Theorems 1-5,
as the optimization problem in this case is not convex.
A. MISO Problem with Gaussian Mean-Based Coding Scheme
The MISO problem with Gaussian mean-based coding scheme can be exactly cast as a
convex optimization problem by considering a linear fractional transformation (Charnes-Cooper
transformation) [36] as follows:
max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log(1 + hTQ1h)−
1
2
log(1 + gTQ1g)
s.t. tr(Q1) + tr(Q2) ≤ P, g
T (Q1 +Q2)g ≥ E˜ (113)
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The objective function is generally not concave. Considering the monotonicity of log, the objec-
tive function can be replaced with the linear fractional objective function 1+hTQ1h
1+gTQ1g
. Following
the linear fractional transformation [36] by multiplying by positive variable t > 0 and defining
Q1 = Q˜1/t, Q2 = Q˜2/t, and fixing the resultant denominator as t+ gT Q˜1g = 1, we obtain the
convex equivalent of the problem in (113) as
max
Q˜1,Q˜20,t>0
t + hT Q˜1h
s.t. t + gT Q˜1g = 1
tr(Q˜1) + tr(Q˜2) ≤ tP, h
T (Q˜1 + Q˜2)h ≥ tE˜ (114)
The optimal solution of (114) can be obtained efficiently using convex solvers, e.g., CVX.
B. MISO Problem with Gaussian Artificial Noise Based Coding Scheme
In this case, we cannot fully transform the problem to a convex form. However, we can apply
similar techniques together with an extra step of line search [37] to solve the problem. The
problem in this case is:
max
Q1,Q20
1
2
log
(
1 +
hTQ1h
1 + hTQ2h
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
gTQ1g
1 + gTQ2g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤β
s.t. tr(Q1) + tr(Q2) ≤ P, g
T (Q1 +Q2)g ≥ E˜ (115)
Next, we upper bound the second term in the optimization problem by 1
2
log β, where β is
the line-search variable. This results in an extra constraint gTQ1g
1+gTQ2g
≤ β − 1. We write the
optimization problem by considering the monotonicity of log and rearranging terms as:
max
Q1,Q20
1 + hT (Q1 +Q2)h
β(1 + hTQ2h)
s.t. gT (Q1 − (β − 1)Q2)g ≤ β − 1
tr(Q1) + tr(Q2) ≤ P, g
T (Q1 +Q2)g ≥ E˜ (116)
Now, by linear fractional transformation [36], we multiply (116) by t > 0, define Q1 =
Q˜1/t,Q2 = Q˜2/t and fix β(t+ hT Q˜2h) = 1. Note that using this transformation, the resultant
problem is a convex problem for fixed β. Hence, iterating over β along its range 1 ≤ β ≤
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1 + P‖h‖2, the problem becomes
max
β
ϕ(β), s.t. 1 ≤ β ≤ 1 + P‖h‖2 (117)
which together with the following can be solved effectively
ϕ(β) = max
Q˜1,Q˜20,t>0
t+ hT (Q˜1 + Q˜2)h
s.t. gT (Q˜1 − (β − 1)Q˜2)g ≤ t(β − 1)
β(t+ hT Q˜2h) = 1
tr(Q˜1) + tr(Q˜2) ≤ tP, g
T (Q˜1 + Q˜2)g ≥ tE˜ (118)
C. General MIMO Problem
For the general MIMO case, we cannot provide a direct convex optimization equivalent as in
the MISO case even by adding a line search. This is due to the concavity of log-determinant
functions, which result in difference of concave functions. To tackle the problem, we can
approximate the objective function using sequential convex optimization techniques [38], [39].
The idea here is to approximate the second term in the objective function by its first order
expansion. To show that, first, consider the objective function of the Gaussian coding with fixed
mean 1
2
log |I+HQ1HT |−
1
2
log |I+GQ1GT |, which is equivalent to log |Q1+N1|−log |Q1+N2|.
We approximate the second term with an affine function using the Taylor series expansion of
the log det function around Q(k), where k denotes the kth iteration:
log |Q1 +N2| ∼= log |Q
(k)
1 +N2|+ tr((Q
(k)
1 +N2)
−1(Q1 −Q
(k))) (119)
Since the constant terms do not affect the optimal solution, we can use
log |Q1 +N2| ∼= tr((Q
(k)
1 +N2)
−1Q1) (120)
The optimization problem in the kth iteration is
max
Q1,Q20
log |Q1 +N1| − tr((Q
(k)
1 +N2)
−1Q1)
s.t. tr(Q1) + tr(Q2) ≤ P, tr(G(Q1 +Q2)G
T ) ≥ E˜ (121)
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which is a convex problem, and can be solved efficiently. We update Q(k)1 ,Q
(k)
2 by solving such
convex optimization problems until convergence.
Finally, using similar ideas, we can perform linearization in the case of Gaussian with artificial
noise coding scheme, where the corresponding optimization problem in the kth iteration is
max
Q2,S0
log |S+N1|+ log |Q2 +N2| − tr((Q
(k)
2 +N1)
−1Q2)− tr((S
(k) +N2)
−1S)
s.t. tr(S) ≤ P, tr(GSGT ) ≥ E˜ (122)
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present simple simulation results for the secrecy capacity of the MIMO
wiretap channel with maximum transmitter-side power constraint and minimum receiver-side
(eavesdropper-side) power constraint. In these simulations, the average transmit power at the
transmitter is taken as P = 10 and the noise covariance is identity at both receivers.
Fig. 2 shows a secrecy capacity receiver-side power constraint region for a MISO 4-1-1
system, i.e, a system with 4 antennas at the transmitter and single antenna at both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. The figure shows the optimality of the Gaussian signalling with
a mean and Gaussian coding with Gaussian artificial noise coding schemes; in particular, the
regions corresponding to the mean and artificial noise coding schemes are identical. Moreover,
the secrecy rate region with receiver-side power region of the standard Gaussian coding scheme
with no mean or no artificial noise is noticeably smaller than the optimal schemes. That is, the
standard Gaussian signaling scheme is strictly sub-optimal for the case of receiver-side power
constraints. In addition, we observe that, as the receiver-side power constraint is increased, the
secrecy capacity decreases, i.e., there is a trade-off between the power that should be delivered to
the eavesdropper’s receiver and the confidentiality that can be provided to the legitimate receiver.
This is because, when the receiver-side power constraint is increased, the problem becomes more
confined and more power should be concentrated for the receiver-side power constraint, which
decreases the set of signalling choices for the secrecy communications. Fig. 3 shows similar
observations for the 2-2-2 MIMO wiretap system.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy capacity receiver-side power constraint region for a 4-1-1 MISO wiretap channel.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the MIMO wiretap channel with the usual transmitter-side maximum power
constraint and an additional receiver-side minimum power constraint. For the converse, we first
proved that the problem is equivalent to solving a secrecy capacity problem with a double-sided
correlation matrix constraint on the channel input. We then extended the channel enhancement
technique to our setting. For the achievability, we proposed two optimum schemes that achieve
the converse rate: Gaussian signalling with a fixed mean and Gaussian signalling with Gaussian
channel prefixing (artificial noise). This is the first instance of a problem where transmission
with a mean or channel prefixing are strictly necessary for a MIMO wiretap channel under
power constraints. The transmission scheme with a mean enables us to deliver the needed power
to the receiver without creating interference to the legitimate receiver as it is a deterministic
signal. On the other hand, the transmission scheme with Gaussian artificial noise, both jams the
eavesdropper contributing to the secrecy as well as delivering the needed power to the receiver.
We note that the optimal coding scheme for the MIMO wiretap channel under a transmitter-side
power constraint only, which is Gaussian signalling with no channel prefixing or mean, is strictly
sub-optimal when we impose a receiver-side power constraint, showing similar to the cases of [1],
[2], that receiver-side power constraints may change the solution significantly and may introduce
non-trivial trade-offs. We then extended our setting to the cases of minimum power constraints at
both receivers in a wiretap channel; maximum receiver-side power constraints at both receivers
in a wiretap channel; minimum receiver-side power constraints in a broadcast channel (i.e., no
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Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity receiver-side power constraint region for a 2-2-2 MIMO wiretap channel.
secrecy constraints); and minimum receiver-side power constraints in a broadcast channel with
confidential messages (i.e., double-sided secrecy constraints).
APPENDIX
CONTINUITY OF THE CAPACITY FUNCTION
We prove our claim in Lemma 2 that C(S1,S2,H,G) is a continuous function with respect
to S2. Although contiguity defined in [11], which is a weaker notion than continuity, suffices to
prove Lemma 2, we prove continuity here. To prove this, we begin by writing the optimization
problem in a general form as in [11, Appendix IV] by concatenating the rows of Q1,Q2 to
form a vector y ∈ R2t2 , where t = max{Nt, Nr}. We denote the point-to-set map Ω(S2) to be
a mapping from S2 to the power set of all subsets of the corresponding feasible set, i.e.,
Ω(S2) = {row concatenation of (Q1,Q2) : Q1,Q2  0, S1  Q1 +Q2  S2} (123)
Denote C(S1,S2,H,G) by C(S2) for notational simplicity as we focus on the argument S2
here. From (11) with Q2 = µµT , we write C(S2) as
C(S2) = max
y∈Ω(S2)
f(y) (124)
where f(y) = 1
2
log |I +HQ1HT | −
1
2
log |I +GQ1GT |. Note that in this case f(y) depends
only on the first t2 elements of y. Now, we use [40, Theorem 7], which states conditions on the
continuity of the optimal value function in mathematical programming to prove the continuity
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of C(S2). In the sequel, we verify that all requirements of [40, Theorem 7] are satisfied.
Since the determinant of an n×n matrix A can be written as det(A) =
∑
σ
sgn(σ)
∏n
i=1 aiσ(i),
where the sum is over all n! permutations of {1, 2, · · · , n}, the determinant in this form is a
polynomial in n2 variables, and det(A) is continuous. Consequently, f(y) is also continuous.
Ω(S2) consists of linear matrix inequalities, hence it is a continuous point-to-set map. Further-
more, Ω(S2) is uniformly compact because for any sequence S(i)2 in the neighborhood of S2,
i.e., the metric distance d(S(i)2 ,S2) = tr
(
(S
(i)
2 − S2)(S
(i)
2 − S2)
T
)
≤ δ2 for some finite δ > 0,
one can find ki = maxλ(S(i)2 ) where λ(S
(i)
2 ) is an eigenvalue of matrix S
(i)
2 such that
Ω(S
(i)
2 ) ⊆ Y = {row concatenation of (Q1,Q2) : Q1,Q2  0, tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ k} (125)
where k = maxi ki ≤ P + δ, where P is the power constraint imposed on SPE. Since Y is
compact and contains
⋃
iΩ(S
(i)
2 ), Ω(S2) is uniformly compact. Hence, the requirements of [40,
Theorem 7] are satisfied and C(S1,S2,H,G) is continuous with respect to S2.
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